The Sublime in Art and Literature Evokes in the Observer Awe Combined With Terror

Introduction

Since Keltner and Haidt (2003)'south seminal newspaper, psychologists have become increasingly interested in awe, an affective experience which is difficult to explain within the traditional dichotomy between positive and negative emotions.¹ It is widely acknowledged that experiences of awe produce in general positive outcomes contributing to mental health (increased pro-social beliefs, life-satisfaction and significant of life – run into, due east.g., Rudd et al., 2012; Piff et al., 2015), and indeed most psychological studies have investigated awe as a positive emotion (encounter, east.g., Griskevicius et al., 2010; Campos et al., 2013; Shiota et al., 2017). However, although awe tin can exist seen equally having an overall positive valence, it has a negative flavor (Chirico et al., 2016, 2017). Awe seems to be a complex emotion or emotional construct characterized past a mix of positive (delectation, happiness), and negative affective components (fear and a sense of beingness smaller, humbler or insignificant). It is interesting to find that beyond English "awe" is often captured by a combination of positive and negative terms significant something like "fear mixed with admiration" ("timore reverenziale," "effroi mêlé d'admiration," "Ehrfurcht", "").

Despite the protean nature of awe, it has been suggested that it is a basic emotion (Ekman, 1992), even having a distinctive facial expression which involves a detail design combining the gaze looking upward, the mouth open up slightly, and slightly oblique eyebrows (Shiota et al., 2003). At that place is currently no consensus about these claims in the psychological literature, which, however, has found convergence points. Nigh studies, influenced by Keltner and Haidt (2003), have taken vastness and need for adaptation to be the prototypical appraisal themes of awe, which is thus defined as a strong emotional response to (physical or metaphorical) grand stimuli needing new conceptual/perceptual resources.

Interestingly, the description of awe in psychology matches well an aesthetic feel widely discussed in the philosophical literature, which has to do with the sublime. Here is a telling excerpt by Thomas Isle of man's The Magic Mountain describing this kind of experience:

Merely if there was something roguish and fantastic about the immediate vicinity through which you lot laboriously fabricated your way, the towering statues of snow-clad Alps, gazing down from the distance, awakened in you feelings of the sublime and holy (Mann, 1924/1996, p. 462).

Huge and steep mountains, starry night skies, waterfalls, grand canyons, deserts, thunderstorms are all examples of one thousand stimuli triggering experiences of the sublime. This type of experience arises when nosotros are confronted with an overwhelming vastness or power and nature offers paradigmatic examples of such a grandeur.

Like awe, the experience of the sublime has an ambivalent valence (Brady, 2013). Equally an aesthetic experience, the experience of the sublime has an overall positive valence (Arcangeli et al., 2019), even though it besides involves a negative affective evaluation of the world, something like terror (Burke, 1759), fright (Kant, 1790/2000) or a feeling of cocky-negation (Cochrane, 2012). Keltner and Haidt (2003) explicitly tie the concept of awe to the philosophical concept of the sublime, and encounter an analogy between the aspects they take awe to have (i.eastward., vastness and need for accommodation) and power and obscurity (as being difficult to grasp by intellect) in Shush's seminal assay of the sublime.

These considerations suggest that what psychologists call "awe" is what philosophers telephone call "experience of the sublime." Do we really have here i type of experience (multifaceted though it is) only, which has just been labeled differently in different disciplines?

Every bit a affair of fact, it is striking that awe is almost absent from the philosophical agenda, while there are very few studies on the experience of the sublime equally such in the psychological literature (see, e.g., Eskine et al., 2012; Ishizu and Zeki, 2014; Hur et al., 2018). The aim of this newspaper is to throw low-cal on the relationship betwixt awe (as understood past psychologists) and the experience of the sublime (as discussed by philosophers). Once we have a clearer moving-picture show of how awe and the experience of the sublime are related, we can utilize it to heighten collaboration betwixt these domains. Nosotros would be able to apply empirical results nearly awe in a philosophical assay of the experience of the sublime, which in turn tin can help us to design novel experimental hypotheses most the contexts in which nosotros experience awe.

Although a terminological equivalence might recommend itself as the simplest, our goal is to bear witness that alternative explanations of the relationship betwixt awe and the feel of the sublime are worth exploring, opening upwardly new paths of interdisciplinary enquiry. More precisely, through a careful analysis of the extant philosophical and psychological literature, we will sort out 7 possible ways in which awe and the feel of the sublime connect. Some of them are less plausible than others and have been merely hinted at in passing by some authors. Appropriately, we will give more space to the near plausible views. In conclusion, we will briefly indicate what is in our view the nearly promising path to understand the circuitous relationship between awe and the experience of the sublime (henceforth ES).

Vii Views on Awe and the Experience of the Sublime

At least 7 views of the relationship betwixt awe and the ES can be envisaged:

A. Awe and ES are the aforementioned blazon of feel.

B. Awe is an ingredient of ES.

C. ES is an ingredient of awe.

D. ES is a species of awe.

E. Awe is a species of ES.

F. Awe and ES share only a proper part.

G. Awe and ES are unrelated to each other.

Let us expand on each of these views in turn.

The Equivalence Between Awe and the Experience of the Sublime

Pick A is the equivalence view suggested by Keltner and Haidt (2003), although their more than detailed view is that ES is awe with some boosted "peripheral or flavoring" features, such as (experience of) beauty (come across option D below). They seem to be followed past Fingerhut and Prinz (2018), who picture awe as intense wonder, and thus the sublime equally a species of beauty. Some philosophers too seem to opt for option A. For example, Brady (2013) writes: "It might be argued that the sublime is a relic best left lonely, perchance better replaced with a concept carrying less weighty historical and metaphysical baggage, such as 'awe' or 'grandeur"' (p. 2). In a similar vein, McShane (2013) notes: "The concept of the sublime as it has been discussed in philosophy (though not in literary criticism) from nigh the mid-eighteenth century onward I take to be the same concept as awe. Many other commentators seem to agree on this signal; Shush's and Kant'southward analyses of the sublime are often discussed in analyses of the nature of awe" (p. 756, fn 34).

Option A entails that all the objects of ES are awe-inspiring. The latter claim is certainly plausible, which already enables usa to exclude option M (i.eastward., that awe and ES have nada in common). Yet, it is not clear that all awe-inspiring objects are also objects of ES or, for that thing, of any artful experience at all. For instance, our awe of Mother Teresa's compassion is arguably not aesthetic (McShane, 2013). Therefore, option A does not seem to exist sustainable.

Is Awe an Ingredient of the Feel of the Sublime or Vice-Versa?

Option B pictures awe as being an ingredient (either a causal determinant or a proper part) of ES. Brady (2013) herself gives vocalization to this option when she describes ES as a mixed feeling, "with certain negative feelings (awe, terror, etc.) felt alongside positive ones (exaltation, admiration)" (p. 40, our italics). She suggests that both Kant and Herder hold this view. Commenting on Herder, Zuckert (2003) writes: "[T]he viewer of sublime architecture such every bit St. Peter's has a progressive experience: she approaches with a feeling of awe, enters and appreciates the decoration and elaboration, and so absorbs and is absorbed past the whole" (p. 220).

These philosophical observations hint at the idea that awe somehow captures the negative component of ES. This seems to be in contrast with what near psychologists advance, namely that awe is a positive emotion (see the Introduction). It should exist noted, still, that some studies suggest the existence of two sorts of awe experiences, a positive and a negative ane, that can be distinguished along several dimensions (subjective experience, physiological correlates and consequences on well-being).

A study by Piff et al. (2015) investigated two awe conditions, a positive and a negative one (elicited by videos about either non-threatening or threatening natural phenomena). They reported that both awe conditions, compared to the control condition, equally produced higher level of awe, and an increased sense of being diminished in the presence of something greater than u.s.a.. By contrast, just negative awe produced increased negative emotions (e.one thousand., anxiety, fear, and nervousness). Like results were reported by Rivera et al. (2019). In the same vein, Sawada and Nomura (2020) showed that positive and negative awe-eliciting videos were rated more awe-inspiring, compared to a control condition, and increased happiness and anxiety ratings, respectively. This distinction is supported by a further work asking participants to describe a memorable awe experience and to report the elicitors, emotions and appraisals related to information technology (Gordon et al., 2017). Participants describing positive and threat-based awe experiences reported comparable levels of awe, but greater levels of fear were associated with the 2d kind of feel only.

Therefore, option B might be supported by claiming that, at least, negative (or threat-based) awe is an ingredient of ES. This view seems to be suggested in the psychological literature by Ishizu and Zeki (2014), who claim that ES "is a distinct cerebral-emotional complex" involving many components, awe included (which they acquaintance with fear and horror), "merely is singled-out from each individually, i.due east., that the whole is other than the parts" (p. vi).

Distinguishing between a positive and a negative type of awe tin can also be used in support of selection C – i.e., the view that ES should be seen as an ingredient of awe. In philosophy this selection has been suggested for example by Kearney (1988) who, commenting on Kant, writes that "the sublime experience of overwhelming super-abundance produces a sense of 'awe"' (p. 175). Some psychologists, based on philosophical theories assigning a pivotal role to fear and terror in ES such that of Kant (run across the Introduction), draw a parallel between the negative species of awe and ES (Gordon et al., 2017), which suggests that the latter is the negative ingredient (either a causal determinant or a proper function) of awe. This view, however, is based on the supposition that ES is mainly associated with potent negative emotions, especially fear. Few empirical studies have tried to investigate this bailiwick. Eskine et al. (2012) reported that fear induction, just not consecration of happiness or of full general physiological arousal, tin increase sublime ratings of pictorial abstract artworks. In another written report sublimity ratings of photographs depicting natural scenarios were correlated with ratings of fear, simply not with ratings of happiness (Hur et al., 2018). These data seem to suggest that ES is associated with fear (see also Chirico and Yaden, 2018), withal this is a questionable hypothesis, which has been nuanced by other works. Information technology should be noted that Hur et al. (2018) themselves did non find whatever physiological testify (from facial electromyography) linking sublimity ratings with physiological markers of fearfulness. In one neuroimaging report on ES, Ishizu and Zeki (2014) reported that sublimity ratings of pictures of nature positively correlated with ratings of pleasantness. Moreover, although in line with philosophical handling of ES they expected to discover activation in encephalon areas classically associated with the feel of fear and threat such as the amygdala and the insula, their results did not show any such action. Pelowski et al. (2019) investigated the cognitive-affective contour of ES in a big sample. They reported that the vast bulk of reports (90.eight%) could be classified under one category associated with positive emotions (e.k., pleasure). They as well found a 2nd statistically pregnant cluster associated with higher level of negative emotions, only this class was quite rare and was also associated with lower ratings of sublimity. It seems, thus, that the prototypical ES would be rather a positive experience (every bit suggested run across the Introduction).

Taken together these findings prove that at that place is not a lucent clan between ES and either positive or negative emotions, and that probably, following Pelowski et al. (2019)'s suggestion, a positive and a negative variant of ES might exist. This would weaken the idea that the sublime is the dark side of awe, and more generally information technology puts pressure on selection C (too as on a specific reading of option D, as it will be fabricated clear soon).

Is the Experience of the Sublime a Species of Awe or Vice-Versa?

The distinction made within the experimental literature between ii sorts of awe tin motivate a more ontologically demanding view than C, namely choice D. While according to the former ES is an ingredient of awe, the latter claims that ES is a species of awe. Therefore, depending on how nosotros interpret what sets autonomously positive and negative awe (i.e., whether they are two aspects of the same species or 2 species, maybe belonging to the aforementioned genus), we tin finish up with the view that ES coincides with the negative species of awe. This view, nonetheless, is open to the same worries raised against selection C, since it besides hinges on the alleged idea that ES is mostly a negative experience.

Option D can be supported by other means, pivoting on different ways of sorting out awe species. In the philosophical literature, Quinn (1997), for instance, distinguishes aesthetic and religious awe (meet as well Clewis, 2019). On this suggestion, pick D is then the additional view that ES coincides with the former species of awe. Indeed, Quinn argues that ES is awe in the absenteeism of religious conventionalities. Among psychologists, Konečni (2011) seems to hold a similar view. Indeed, his aesthetic theory, which posits aesthetic awe as the peak aesthetic feel, treats the latter "every bit the prototypical subjective reaction to a sublime stimulus-in-context, (…) 1 aspect of aesthetic awe, which distinguishes it from awe that is induced by fearfulness, is existential security of the experiencing person" (p. 65). There are no prima facie reasons confronting this reading of pick D, which remains a workable option.

As far as we know, selection Eastward, according to which awe is a species of ES, has not been pursued in the psychological literature. In philosophy, information technology seems that simply Shush (1759) has explicitly endorsed it. According to him, the "highest degree" of ES is astonishment and its "subordinate degrees" are awe, reverence, and respect (p. 123). One way of supporting E is to appeal to a distinction fatigued past Shapshay (2013a, b) between two varieties of ES: while the "thin sublime" is a largely non-cerebral, affective arousal, the "thick sublime" also involves a cognitive play of ideas (especially well-nigh the place of man beings inside the surround). On the hypothesis that awe is a purely non-cognitive, emotional response (simply see fn1), it might be suggested that information technology coincides with a species of ES, namely the "thin sublime."

The question is not settled, nonetheless, since the thought that awe is an emotion tin also pb to choice D. If awe is a basic emotion and the sublime is a culturally specific category (as suggested in the classic study by Nicolson, 1963), then awe may very well be an ingredient of ES, but it would unlikely exist the other way around.

Only a Common Denominator Betwixt Awe and the Experience of the Sublime

Finally, according to option F, there is a common denominator betwixt awe and ES, although they differ from each other in all other respects. Edifice on our previous discussion, a plausible proposition is that they involve the same kind of negative affective appraisement. Both experiences involve existence overwhelmed by a stimulus as well vast (big, powerful, etc.) for our ordinary cerebral ways of apprehending and coping with the globe. Option F goes further, and states that awe and ES do not have annihilation else in mutual. In particular, they involve different kinds of positive affective evaluation (or only ES has an overall positive valence after all).

Discussion

What should we conclude from the foregoing critical comments on the complex relationship between awe and ES? Allow'southward showtime by taking on board the plausible suggestion but made, that they involve at least the aforementioned kind of negative affective appraisal. At present both awe and ES too involve a positive evaluation. They are the kind of experience that we seek for and want to reproduce. The adjacent question is then whether we should consider the positive evaluation involved in awe to be too involved in ES, and how.

Suppose, as is sometimes claimed (see Brady's quotation in the previous department), that the positive evaluation in awe is adoration. If this positive evaluation is also involved in ES, information technology follows that in having the latter, aesthetic experience, nosotros experience admiration. Now what would be the object of our admiration? In the example of religious awe, it is obvious what the object of admiration is, namely God (or some divinity). In contrast (although the signal is certainly controversial), it is not all obvious that admiration is the key concept involved in ES, or more than generally in artful experience.

An interesting proposal, put forward by McShane (2013), is that awe involves an evaluation of the importance of the awe-inspiring object, which impresses us in some respect. This might lead to a defense of option D: ES would be a species of awe, namely aesthetic awe. This defense would go like this. The concept of importance is relatively formal, and there are different types of importance. Thus, if all cases of awe involve the same kind of positive evaluation (the object of awe is subjectively evaluated as being of great importance), different cases of awe concern different species of importance. One of these species is aesthetic importance, or importance from an aesthetic betoken of view. Of course, such a defence should make clear what artful importance is precisely, but it would exist a way of reconciling 2 (apparently conflicting) intuitions we might have about awe and ES, that they are very close experiences, and that awe need non be an artful experience.

We suspect that any psychological written report of awe, whatever its valence (positive or negative) and the domain it concerns (aesthetic, religious, social, etc.) should take a stance on its relationship with ES. At the aforementioned time, though, philosophers should become more interested in awe itself and its role in the determination of the overall valence of ES. What nosotros take offered here is of grade merely an do in conceptual geography, and further interdisciplinary studies should go deeper in the specification of, and comparison among, the more than promising options we have delineated hither.

Author Contributions

MA, MS, AJ, PP, and JD have contributed every bit to the analysis of the literature and to the finalization of the manuscript. MA proposed the structure of the presentation (with JD) and has been the main redactor.

Funding

This written report was funded past the SublimAE project (ANR-18-CE27-0023), and for MA and JD, as well supported past the ANR-17-EURE-0017 FrontCog and the ANR-ten-IDEX-0001-02 PSL.

Conflict of Involvement

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absenteeism of whatever commercial or financial relationships that could exist construed as a potential disharmonize of involvement.

Abbreviations

ES, experience of the sublime.

Footnotes

1. ^ Awe is almost always considered to be an emotion or an emotional construct. Whether it represents a single construct referred to by all researchers is of course debatable. We suspect that clarifying its relationship to the feel of the sublime will also clarify its nature. Some other issue concerns the relationship between emotion and cognition. When we consider awe equally an emotion, we leave information technology open up whether it also involves cognitive elements.

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